State of Utah v. Joseph Dean Peterson : Brief of Appellant by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)
1949
State of Utah v. Joseph Dean Peterson : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
McCullough, Wilkinson & Boyce; Attorneys for Defendant and Appellant;
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, State v. Peterson, No. 7286 (Utah Supreme Court, 1949).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/1043
J 
·• i~e SupreJDe Court 
ot the State of \Jtah 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
JOSEPH DEAN PETERSON, 
Defendant an.d Appellant, 
Case No. 
7286 
ll?IL E 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM THE ·---ClERK~-SUPREMECOURT~ 
FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR UINTAH COUN'TY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
HONORABLE WILLIAM STANLEY DUNFORD 
McCULLOUGH. WILKINSON & BOYCE 
Attorneys for Defendant '(J!I'I)d Appe:llant 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
INDEX 
• • • • • • • 
• • • • • • • • 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • 
PROPOSITI0!1 I 
The ool.ll't erred ln adat1 t ttna 
teatlnonr ot tbe I'Wooatton ot 
Page 
1 
J~) 
ld~ 1" 
the drt ver' a license · or tl» · 
defendant • • • • • • • • • • • 48 
~OPOSTT!Olf II 
Tho oourt erred in admlt"tf.'n; 
evtdenoe on the iaauo as to 
whether the detendant was tmdeP 
the tntluenoe of 1ntox1cat1ng 
11'".'" ·I' at the t.1me ot tho 
all;p. arl• • • • . • . • • . 64 
?itOPOSI'l'IO!i III 
The oo\ll'tt Ol'red :tn ove'l'l'\ll11lg 
defendant.'• motion t·o dlerdes 
the lntOI'ml.tlo.ft and dlaoharge 
the detendant at the· 9 lqsi:ot 
the State's oaae (T. 470. · ) 
and 1n retustng to pant · eten-
<lant 'a request-a 1nstt"'.:~ot1 on 
no. 1 C1. 22, 'r. 720) to dtl'Ject 
the Jur:r to return a ver-di c. t · ot 
not gu11t7 •• • •• • • • • • 69 
PROPOS!!JION IV 
The court lti'Nd in rall1n; to 
1Mtruot the j'Uf'J' a• to the 
.elonenta or tnvol\ll).tarr ttan-
alaughtelt and the law pertain .. 
1n1 thereto, but on tbe contrtU-)" 
o~neou.sl7 1natNcted the . J\l'r7 
on those tun4amental pr1nc1pleo. 70 
4 ~ • ... • "' ... ~ •• ... • ... 
CONCt.TT1 rON' • • • • • • • • • • • • • 12 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
INDEX 
Page 
STATEMENT OF FACT····················~~~~---··········-·······-----·-····-······-··--------- 1 
STATEMENT OF ERRORS ·········-····--·····------···--·-····-·······-·---·--~---·····------- 43 
ARGUMENT ----·--------·--·--···········---··------·--·--------··-·········--······················----·-- 48 
PROPOSITION I ··--·--······················--··-····--···-·-··············---------------------- 48 
PROPOSITION II ----·-···--------·-··-------····--·····--····--··········--·-··········--------- 64 
PROPOSITION III .............................................................................. 69 
PROPOSITION IV .............................................................................. 70 
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................ 72 
Authorities 
CASES: 
State of Utah v. Lingman, 97 Utah 197 to 201 ................................ 50, 55 
People v. Black, (1931, 11 Cal. App. 90, 295 P. 87 ................................ 56 
State v. Long, (1919), (Delaware), 7 Boyce 397, 108 A. 36 ................ 56 
State v. Mcivor, (1920), 31 Del. 123, 111 A. 616 .................................. 56 
ThompSon v. State, (1933), 108 Fla. 370, 146 So. 201 .................... 56, 57 
State v. Gee, (1930), 48 Idaho 688, 284 P. 845 ...................................... 56 
Dunnville v. State, (1919), 188 Ind. 373, 123 N.E. 689 ---····-·····------~56, 57 
Blackburn v. State, 1932), 203 Ind. 332, 180 N.E. 180 .................... 56, 58 
People v. Barnes, (1914), 182 Mich. 179, 148 N.W. 400 .................. 56, 58 
State v. Satterfield, (1930), 198 N. C. 682, 153 S.E. 155 ............... .J56, 59 
State v. Schaeffer, (1917), 96 Ohio St. 215, 117 N.E. 220, LRA 
1918B, 945, Ann. Cas. 1918E, 1137 ............................................... J36, 60 
Jackson v. State, (1920), 101 Ohio St. 152, 127 N.E.. 870 ................ 57, 59 
Keller v. State, (1927), 155 Tenn. 633, 299 S.W. 803, ,59 A.L.R. 685 .. 57 
Hiller v. State, (1932), 164 Tenn. 388, 50 S.W. (2d) 225 ---------------~.57, 61 
Norman v. State, (1932), 121 Tex. Crim. Rep. 433, 52 S.W. 
(2d) 1051 ------------···--------------·····----------------------··············--····-----······---57, 68 
Goodman v. Com., (1930), 153 Va. 943, 151 S.E. 168 ...................... 57, 69 
Rex v. Wilmot, (1930), 64 Ont. L. Rep. 605, 52 Can. Grim. 
Cas. 336 (1930) 1 D.L.R. 778 ............................................................ 57 
TEXT: 
Blashfield Cyclopedia of Automobile Law and Practice, Vol 8, 
p. 102 ...................................................................................................... 69 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In the SupreDie Court 
of the State of Utah 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
JOSEPH DEAN PETERSON, 
DefenOO!nt a-nd Appellant, 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
S'TATEMENT OF FACT 
Case No. 
7286 
The errors assigned in this case justify a detailed 
epitome of the testimony given by the only two wit-
nesses who made any observation of the mo~ement of 
the truck which was involved in the dea!th of the de-
ceased, James Curwood. 'These two witnesses are Bert 
Karen and Lawrence Karen, his brother. The deceased 
had been riding in the Karen pickup truck just prior to 
an accident on U. S. Highway 40 about a mile and half 
east of the tittle town of Jensen, Utah, and about :ten 
miles east of Vernal. The undisputed evidence shows 
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Lawrence Karen and the deceased were drunk at the 
time of the accident and, therefore, the testimo:Qy of 
Lawrence Karen is of little value in the cas·e. His 
testimony, however, will be carefully noted in this State-
ment of Fact. 
On the afternoon of Saturday, September 6, 1947, 
Lawrence Karen and the deceased, James Curwood, 
were in the Collier Beer Par'lor drinking beer. They had 
been there practically all afternoon. ( T. 15, 32). On 
Saturday evening, September 6, 1947, Bert Karen met 
his brother and Curwood at the beer parlor and they 
all had some more beers there. ('T. 32). 'The three of 
them then decided to go over to Artesia, Colorado, for 
a social trip. Artesia is a l~ttle border town in Colorado 
where hard liquors are sold by the drink. They bought 
a half dozen 1bott'les of beer to drink on the way ov,er to 
Artesia. They got over to Artesia between 8 :00 and 
9:00P.M. ('T. 33). They went to a liquor tavern known 
as "The Well". They stayed in this place un1til a quar-
ter of 2:00 Sunday morning. (T. 34-5). They spent 
their time drinking wiskey and beer. Bert Karen testi-
fied that he didn't keep traek of how much beer he 
drank, but he knew he had had at least one drink ·of 
wiskey and four bottles of beer. (T. 62-3). Ber1t Karen 
testified that the deceased, James Curwood, and his 
brother, Lawrence Karen, had an argument with the 
patrons of the tavern which caused considerable dis-
turbance and the Colorado officers were about to 'throw 
the two of them in jail for drunkenness when Bert Karen 
interceded for them, stating that he would take them 
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hoine in his truck. ( T. 17, 36). There is no question 
at that time the deceased and Lawrence Karen were 
thoroughly intoxicated. They left Artesia about a quar-
ter' of 2:00, although neither witness could fix the time 
except by the fact that Sammy Hatch, a highway patrol-
man, to1d them the accident occured around 3:00 o'clock 
in the morning. (T. 38). As they travelled toward 
Vernal, Utah, Bert Karen stopped the ~truck on High-
way 40 about a mile or mile and half east of the Jensen 
Bridge and about 300 yards east of the Escalante Monu-
ment for the purpose of urinating. ·The following testi-
mony is pertinent : 
"Q. And as a matter of fact, you heard the of-
ficer say your brother and this man Curwood 
wer·e drunk, didn't you~ 
A. Well, they felt pretty doggone good. 
Q. By that you mean they were drunk, weren't 
they~ 
A. Well, I am not sure, I guess that is what you 
wouid call it, I don't know. 
Q. Isn't that what you told us in the preliminary 
hearing, that the both of them were drunk, 
not only there but when you got out to the 
place where you got out ·to urinate, that they 
were drunk then; didn't you testify to that 
at the preliminary hearing~ 
A. That's right. 
Q. And I ask you this: 'You knew those two 
fellows, your brother and the other man, were 
drunk, didn't you, at the time you stopped to 
get out to urinate~' And your answer was: 
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'Yes'. That was your testimony, wasn't it~ 
A. That's right. 
Q. And when you got up to the Au Miller store 
your brother was so drunk he sat out there by 
ithe pumps and was so sick he didn't go back 
even to the scene of the accident, wasn't he? · 
A. Well, I didn't ask him to go back. 
Q. I know, but as a matter of fact he was so 
sick and drunk he didn't even go back~ 
A. Well, I don't know whether he was sick or 
not. 
Q. Well he was drunk anyway, wasn't he~ 
A. He was ful'l.'' (T. 36-37). 
At the place where they stopped, Highway 40 was 
a hard surfaced road approximately itwenty feet wide, 
split down the middle with a yellow line, making two 
t·en-foot lanes for east and west travel. On the right 
hand side of the road as you travel toward Vernal, or 
what is known as the south side of the highway, there 
was a two-foot shoulder and immediately to the south 
a rather percipitous or steep bank which s'loped into 
a borrow pit; that Bert Karen parked his truck on a 
bias pointing in a southeasterly direction; that the front 
wheels of his truck were on the right ·shoulder but a 
substantial portion of the truck remained on the south 
traffic lane; that the truck was approximately eighteen 
or twenty feet long; that he could not run the, car down 
into the borrow pit and, therefore, a substantial part 
of the 1truck was out on the hard surfaced area on the 
right side. The following testimony is important: 
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"Q. Anyway, it is how far east of the Esca'lante 
:Monument, we will call that~ 
A. Well, I could say about three hundred yards. 
Q. Three hundred yards~ 
A. I am just guessing at it. though. 
Q. Some distance east f 
A. Yes. 
Q. And it is down in the bottom of a swale there, 
isn ':t it? 
A. That's right. 
Q. And over on the right hand side, that. is the 
right hand side as you go into Vernal, is a 
rather steep borrow pit, isn't there~ 
A. Yes, it is kind of sloped off. 
Q. But the bank is rather precipitous or steep, 
isn't it~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And the shoulder of the hard surfaced area 
is about two feet wide, isn't it~ 
A. Well I would be guessing if I said yes on that. 
Q. Is that what you testified to in the prelimi-
nary hearing~ 
A. It is about like that. 
Q. What is your best judgment~ 
A. Well I would say two feet. 
Q. Then it goes abruptly down int0 a borrow 
pit, which of course you couldn't run your 
car into the borrow pit, could you~ 
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A. No, sir. 
Q. So that you had approximately two feet of 
shoulder on the righthand side of your ear 
onto which you stopped your car as you have 
indicated. 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And your car was. a Ford pickup truck, wasn't 
it' 
A. That's right. 
Q. And approximrutely somewheres in the neigh-
borhood of eighteen or twenty feet long? 
A. That is about right. 
Q. This hard surfaced ar,ea is a two lane high-
way, isn't it' 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. It is split down the midd~e with a yellow line~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And both the two sides are about somewheres 
in the neiglrborhood of ten feet wide, are 
they not, ten foot lanes, about and a twenty 
foot highway going up there? 
A. I never measured it, hut that is about right. 
Q. So ~that your car when you parked onto this 
two foot shoulder, a substantial part of your 
car was out on the hard surfaced area on the 
righthand side, wasn't it' 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. So that when you got out you got out of the 
car on the left hand side where the hard sur-
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faced area was, and you walked around to 
the front of the car, didn't you~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Where the other fellows got out, yon don't 
know, do you~ 
A. No sir, I didn't pay no attention to them. 
Q. Didn't pay any attention. Yon knew at that 
time they were both drunk, didn't you. 
A. Yes. 
Q. And whether they got out on the lefthand side 
or got out on the righthand side, you didn't 
see them get out, did you. 
A. No, didn't pay any attention. 
Q. And you didn't s·ee Mr. Curwood, the man 
that was killed, or assuming he was killed, 
you didn't see him at all until you saw his 
body flying on the pavement over about four-
teen inches to ~the right of the lefthand ·edge 
of the road, did you~ 
A. No, sir." (T. 40-1-2). 
Bert Karen got out of the truck, went around the 
lefthand side to the front of the car to urinate. He 
glanced back over his shoulder and saw the flights of a 
car coming from the east and traveling toward Vernal. 
He watched the lights come down a rather long grade 
to the bottom of the swale, where the Karen truck was 
parked as aforesaid. 'The following testimony is ex-
tremely important and we quote from the record: 
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'' Q. When you got out of the car you walked out 
to the front of the car~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And where the other two gentlemen went to 
1that were with you, you don't lmowT 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Whether they got out on the righthand side 
as you come toward Vernal, righthand side 
of your car, you don't lmow~ 
A. I never paid no attention to them. 
Q. And you got in the front of the car you hap-
pened ~to look over our shoulder, kind of 
glanced back over your shoulder, didn't you~ 
A. That is about right. 
Q. And you saw the lights· of a car coming from 
the east, we will call the general direction 
east, coming from Artesia, the same direction 
you were going, coming down a rather long 
grade that comes down to ~the bottom of that 
swa1e~ 
A. Y~es, sir. 
Q. And there was nothing about the movement 
of those lights that attracted yol)r attention, 
was there~ 
A. No, there wasn't that I noticed. 
Q. And when the lights approached your car, the 
car with the lights, turned over to the left-
hand side~ 
A. 'Thwt's right. 
Q. Of the road, to go around you so that there 
would be no collision with your car! 
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A. It sure did. 
Q. And that was the normal thing for the car 
to do, wasn't it? 
A. That's right. 
Q. Because if he had kept coming down lthe 
righthand side of the road he would have 
hit right in the back of your car, wouldn't he~ 
A. That's right. 
Q. So that the lights turned over, and assuming 
the lights were attached to the car, turned 
over to the righthand side of the road~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. To the lefthand side as we come toward V er-
nal, your lefthand side~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. Then as the car passed you heard a bump? 
A. That's right. 
Q. And that is the only thing that attracted your 
aHention to the movement of that particular 
car that was out of the ordinary, wasn't it~ 
A. Yes, it was; it startled me a little there. 
Q. Now after the car passed on up the road, you 
saw some clearance lights~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And you presumed by the fact that it had 
clearance lights that it was a truck~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And after it had gone up the road, you looked 
up the road and saw Curwood lying on the 
pavement, didn't you~ 
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A. That's right. 
Q. And that is the first time that you saw 
Karen-
A. I didn't-
Q. Not Karen, hut Curwood, I mean Jimmy Cur-
wood, lying on the pavement. And that is the 
first time you saw him after you had stopped 
your car and got out of the truck and went 
to the front~ 
A. That's right. 
Q. How he got in that position you don't know, 
do you~ 
A. I don't know. 
Q. Now you ran up the road to where the body 
was, didn't you. 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And where was the body with reference to 
the lefthand side, lefthand side of the hard 
surfaced area, that is, your lefthand side as 
you traveled toward Vernal~ 
A. He was, oh, about a foot and a half to the 
edge of the pavement, just like that is the 
edge of the pavement here (indicating). 
Q. You mean a foot and a half toward the cen-
ter~ 
A. On the lefthand side. 
Q. That wouid 'be a foot and a half from ~the 
lefthand edge of the hard surfaced ar,ea as 
you move toward the center of the streetT 
A. Yes, sir. 
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Q. About in that position when you saw him? 
A. That's right. 
Q. And was he lying on his belly, as you stated 
a m.inute ago, or on his stomach? 
A. That's right. 
Q. Then you told us about putting your hand on 
him, and so on. You were there for some 
appreciable time before your brother came 
up, weren't you? 
A. Well I don't know whether it was just-I 
imagine maybe split seconds or something 
like that. 
Q. You don't know, don't have any independent 
memory how long it was before your brother 
came up? 
A. I wouliln 't say becaus·e I don't know. 
Q. And can you give the jury any idea how this 
man Curwood got over on the opposite side 
of the road from where your car was par'ked? 
You don't know, I suppose? 
A. Well I don't know how he got over there. 
Q. And the fact that both he and your brother 
were drunk never entered into your head 
about watching their movements after you got 
out of the car? 
A. No, I didn't. 
Q. Now when these lights came down the high-
way that were on the truck or whatever it 
was that passed and you heard a thump, there 
wasn't any movement of those lights, or the 
car upon which the lights were situated, that 
attracted your attention as far as being out 
of the ordinary movement, was there? 
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A. No, not that I cou'ld say. 
Q. When the car passed you and continued on up 
the street, isn't it a fact that the car was go-
ing about the same rate of speed as the ordi-
nary car goes on that highway~ 
A. That is about right. 
Q. It wasn't going fast and it wasn't going slow, 
was it~ 
A. No. it was just-
Q. Going about medium~ 
A. About an ordinary speed. 
Q. Going about medium, is what you testified 
to at the preliminary-hearing. 
A. 'That's right. 
Q. So that the speed of the car was not out of 
the ordinary and was about the same speed 
as the ordinary careful driver would drive 
on that road~ 
A. That is what I would say. 
Q. And the only other movement of the car ex-
cepting its forward movement that you o1b-
served was the fact that when it approached 
the 1back end of your car the car moved over 
to the lefthand side of the highway, went 
around your car~ (T. 42-3-4-5-6-7) 
Q. After the truck passed you did you see it 
turn back over on to the right side of the 
road~ 
A. Well, about all I could see it was going down 
the road. 
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Q. Didn't it turn back over onto the righthand 
side of the road~ 
.l\.. I don't recall it did. 
Q. It just went straight on up the road as far 
as you remember it? 
A. As far as I know. 
Q. There wasn't anything disturbing at all in 
the manner in which it went up the road, was 
there~ 
A. There didn't seem to be. 
Q. Apparently just normal movement of the car 
as it went on up the street~ 
A. That is the way it seemed to me. (T. 48) 
Bert Karen did not move Curwood but left him on 
the road, lying on his stomach. He and his brother Law-
rence then drove to Harry AuMiller's store at Jensen 
where Sainmy Hatch, State Highway Patrolman, was 
notified by telephone of the accident. About f'Orty min-
utes later Hatch met them at the store and Bert Karen 
and Hatch returned to the scene of the accident. Law-
rence Karen was left at the service station in a drunken 
condition~ When they got back to the scene of the acci-
dent a Burlington bus had stopped with its lights shining 
on the body and the driver had put out flares to keep 
traffic away from the area, (T. 50). On redirect exam-
ination by Mr. Colton, Bert Karen testified that he did 
not show Mr. Hatch the approximate location of where 
his truck was stopped the night of the accident. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
14 
''A. You mean take him out there and show him? 
Q. No the night of the accident did you~strike th~t; You stated to Mr. McCuUough that this 
was the general location but the exact spot, 
you don't know? 
A. No, I don't know if this was the exact spot 
or not. 
Q. Now, I ask you a question, did you show Mr. 
Hatch the night of the accident the approxi-
mate location where you parked your car 
when you stopped? 
A. I don't believe I did." (T. '56). 
On recross examination by ~1r. McCu11ough the wit-
ness testified as follows: 
'' Q. And you didn't show Mr. Hatch at any time 
where you parked the car on the road, did 
you? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. You couldn't tell the make of the truck, if it 
was a truck that passed, as you have ·indi-
cated, you couldn't tell the make of the truck~ 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Couldn't tel~ the color of the truck¥ 
A. No, I couldn't say that I could. 
Q. And you watched those clearance lights for 
some time as it went up the road, didn '1t you~ 
A. Yes, I would say I thought it was a long time, 
but seconds anyway. 
Q. \Yell, as it went up the road you could see 
those clearance lights for at least a quarter 
or a half mile, couldn't you¥ 
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A. Well, see them for quite a long ways up the 
road." (T. 60-1). 
At this point in the testimony the court took the noon 
recess. After the noon recess the witness was recalled 
to the stand and on redirect examination stated that he 
had made a mistake in his previous testimony and that 
he had shown Sammy Hatch where he had parked his 
pickup truck on the night of the accident and that Sammy 
Hatch had made a cross on the ,edge of the road right 
where the Karen truck had 1been parked. (T. 71). On 
recross examination he reluctantly admitted that he had 
talked to the prosecuting officials about this testimony 
during the noon recess. ( T. 78). The change in this 
witness' testimony was necessary for the admission of 
·pictures offered by the State of the exact location of the 
accident and particularly State's Exhibits A, J and 0. 
Bert Karen testified that he did not know where ~ir. 
Curwood was struck, or the position he was in on the 
road when he was struck, or whether he was lying down, 
or whether he was standing up, or what his position may 
have been at the time he was struck. As far as he knew 
Curwood could have been 'lying right on the road when 
he was struck by the car. (T. 53). 
The meager testimony of Lawrence Karen, the bro-
ther of Bert Karen, is of little value in determining what 
happened at the scene of the accident. This witness ad-
mitted that he was in a drunken condition. He classified 
his state of intoxication as being "medium drunk." (R. 
90-1-2). This witness rt.estified that besides the beer which 
he consumed, he drank from six to eight glasses of whis-
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key before he left Artesia to return to Vernal at about 
2:00 o'clock in the morning. He testified he was riding 
with his brother Bert and the deceased Curwood in a 
pickup truck; that his brother Bert was driving the truck; 
that he was on the righthand side and Curwood was in the 
center; that they stopped the truck someplace east of the 
river at Jensen and "we all got out for a littl.e relief." 
(T. 82) He got out on the righthand side. He doesn't 
know what side the deceased got out of the truck as he 
did not see him until after the accident occured. ('T. 83). 
After getting out of the truck the witness went down into 
the borrow pit to take care of the wants of nature, saw 
some lights coming down the road and turned his back 
to 'them because of the act he was performing at the 
time in reHeving himself. (T. 96-7). The next thing he 
heard was a thump. Then he heard a ''pi tty pat'' down 
the pavement and saw someone running down the pave-
ment. He climbed out of the borrow pit and ran down the 
road. He saw Jimmy Curwood on the lefthand side ofthe 
pav:ement and his brother was standing over him. Cur-
wood's head was down and my brother said "my God, he 
is dead'' and said well don't touch him, let's get the law. 
In a moment or so they ran back to the truck and went to 
Jensen to call the law. (T. 84)' He testified that ithree or 
four minutes elapsed from the time they stopped the 
truck until he heard the bump. ('T. 85). The witness 
further testified as follows : 
'' Q. In other words, Sammy HaJ~h told you that 
the accident happened around about three 
o'clock~ 
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A. He said that was about the time he got there, 
or got the call. 
Q. And upon what he told you, you concluded 
you must have left Artesia around two o'clock 
in the morning1 
A. Approximately about that. 
Q. And that is the only way you can place the 
time, by what Sammy Hatch told you? ' 
A. Yes, sir, that's all the time I had. 
Q. And if Sammy Hatch hadn't told you that 
you wouldn't have known when you left Ar-
tesia, would you 1 
A. No, sir. 
Q. When you stopped down at the plac~ some-
where east of the river, or down at Jensen, 
you say you got out the righthand side of 
the truck? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And went down into the borrow pit? 
A. Yes, sir, stepped off-
Q. Did you take care of the wants of nature? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And the lights that were coming down the 
road, you turned your back to them~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Because of the act you were performing at 
the time in reHeving yourself 1 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And the next thing you heard was a thump1 
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Yes, sir. 
And after you heard the thump the next thing 
you heard, you said about three or four 
seconds or minutes after the thump or bump, 
you heard someone running down the road 1 
A. Y~es, sir. 
Q. And did you see where the lights of this car 
had gone by this time~ · 
A. No, sir, I didn't pay any attention to the 
lights of that truck. · 
Q. The only time you ever saw any lights of the 
car that came down the road was when you 
got out into a thistle patch and the lights 
were coming down the road and you turned 
your back, and you never saw the lights after 
that on the car~ 
A. No, sir. 
Q. That's correct, isn't it~ 
A. That's right. 
Q. Then when you heard someone running down 
'the road you went down the road too, didn't 
you~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. When you went down the road did you see 
any blood for a distance of approximately 
179 feet leading east from where you 8aw 
something lying in the road~ 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Did you see any smears of blood for a dis-
tance of thirty or forty feet running east of 
where the person, or whoever it was that 
was in the road? ' 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
19 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Didn't see any blood at that time all? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Then when you got down there you stayed 
only a couple of seconds, didn't you. 
A. I would say approximately that, yes, sir. 
Q. Then you went back to your truck, you and 
your brother? 
.A_ Yes, sir. 
Q. And the person that you saw in the road was 
Jimmy Curwood? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Where was the person of Jimmy Curwood at 
the time you saw him in the road~ 
A. It was on the southwest side of the highway. 
Q. That would he on the 1efthand ·side as you 
are coming towards Vernal? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. How far from the lefhand edge of the pave-
ment? 
A. I couldn't say as to that, that is, accurately. 
I would say possibly, from the approximation, 
maybe two or three feet. 
Q. You didn't observe it carefully? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Then you went hack to your car. 
A. Yes, sir. 
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Q. On your way back to your car did you see 
any blood from the person of Mr. Curwood 
stretching out for 179 fee~t~ 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Did you see any smear of blood running down 
the road to the east, or toward Artesia, from 
the person of Mr. Curwood for a distance of 
thirty or forty feet~ 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Then you drove on into Au Miller's or into 
Jensent 
A. Y·es, sir. 
Q. And left Mr. Curwood out there on the road T 
A. Yes, sir." (T. 96-7-8-9). 
S. D. HATCH, 'State Highway P~trolman, testified 
that he recived a call at his home at 3:18a.m. that there 
had been an accident on Highway 40; that he immedi-
ately dressed and went out on the road; that he observed 
a large red Federal truck coming into Vernal on Highway 
40 and about 3rd East Street; that he waived the truck 
down between 4th and 5th East 'Street; that the truck 
pulled over to the side of the road and he walked around 
to the door on the driver's side and recognized the de-
fendant, Dean Peterson, as the driver. He had a con-
versation as follows: 
'' Q. Will you state to us in substance or effect 
the conversation then had between you and 
Mr. Peterson~ 
A. I asked him if he had been-as near as I 
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recall my exact words were, 'How far eas1t 
have you been, Dean~' To which he replied, 
'I have been out to Wileys. ' I said, 'Did you 
just come in from Wileys ~' 'Yes,' that was 
his answer, 'yes.' And at that time I asked 
him to step out of the truck. 
Q. And did he~ 
A. He stepped out, yes.'' ( T. 116). 
He testified that the defendant had an odor of in-
toxicating liquor on his breath and from his observation 
and conversation he concluded that he was under the 
influence of intoxicating liquor. He found a whiskey 
flask with some whiskey in it and a full coca-cola bottle 
in the cab of the truck. 'The City Marshal, Calvin Jor-
genson, came up about that time and Mr. Hatch instruc-
ted him to take the defendant to the police station and 
to hold his truck until he returned. At thaJt time Mr. 
Hatch testified that there was some damage to the left 
front headlight and fender of the truck as shown by the 
pictures, State's Exhibits F and G. ·The defendant 
denied having an accident or running over any person. 
Pursuant to the instructions of Mr. Hatch, Calvin J or-
genson, the night marshal, told the defendant to drive the 
truck to the police station, which he did. Mr. Hatch 
testified that the examination of the truck and the con-
versation with Mr. Peterson occupied approximately five 
minutes. (T. 271). That he stopped Peterson at 3:25 
a.m.; about 3 :30 he started toward Jensen and when 
he got just beyond the GaJteway Cafe, which is on about 
8th East Street, he stopped another truck, a water tank 
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truck ·of F. R. Finley which was being driven by a party 
by the name of John Gibbs. He took Mr. Gibb's chauf~ 
feur·'s licensH and told him to drive the truck up to the 
police station. He watched to see if they were complfing 
with his instructions and when they turned off Highway 
40 toward the police station he concluded that 1they wo'uld 
comply with his orders. He went on to Jensen wh~re 
he picked up Bert Karen at the Au Miller store but left 
Lawrence Karen sitting on the pump standard. They 
then drove 1to the scene of the accident. There ·was an 
apparently life1ess man lying on the rDad; a Burlington 
bus heading east had its headlights shining on the body 
and ·the bus driver Spike Hayworth, had put flares 
around the area to keep traffic away. (T. 130-2). The 
body was lying face down; the head east and the i~eet 
to the· wesit; the head was about fourteen or fifteen 
inches from the edge of the pavement and one leg was 
stretched out partly on the paved surface and partly 
on the north shoulder. ('T. 134). The hody was then 
put on a blanket and lifted to the side of 1the road. There 
was a pool of blood about seventeen or ·eighteen ·inches 
in diameter where the man's head had lain. Sheriff 
H. N. Snyder of Uintah County arrived· at the scene of 
the accident and assisted Mr. Hatch in making certain 
measuremenrts. That 34 fe~et east of the pool of b~ood 
they found one shoe on the road on one side of the· center 
~ine and 54 feet east they found another shoe on the 
other side of the center line. (T. 137). The shoes were 
offered and received in evidence and later identified as 
shoes belonging to the deceased, who was in the habit 
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of ;wearing shoes without shoe laces. Hatch testified that 
B~rt ·Karen had told him that he parked as near as he 
could recall at a place about forty-two steps east of the 
bodythat was on the road. ('T. 139). Hatch and Sheriff 
Snyde1· returned to the police s:tation and questioned the 
defendant about his movements on Saturday night, the 
6th, and Sunday morning, the 7th. 
: When Mr. Hatch and the sheriff returned to the 
police station and further questioned the defendant con-
cerning the accirent, the defendant again reiterated that 
he· knew nothing about the accident. When asked about 
the damage to his left headlight, he said he did nolt know 
when it occured; that his sister had driven the truck 
the day before but he had not noticed the damage until it 
was called to his attention by Mr. Hatch. 
· About 6 :30 in the morning and 'Shortly after day-
break Mr. Hatch again returned to the scene of the acci-
dent and made numerous measurements as shown by his 
testimony. He testified there was a smear of blood 
aboutt. six or seven inches wide running back east of the 
body along the north side of the highway some forty feet; 
th,e blood then thinned out on the pavement to a point 
179 feet east of the body. ('T. 150-154). 'The Karen car 
was parked 126 feet east of the large pool of blood where 
Curwood was found and the blood was in evidence 179 
feet east of the pool. (T. 153). The following excerpts 
from the witness' testimony are pertinent: 
'' 'Mr. Hatch, you stated you saw a smear 
of blood. State what you saw there. 
'A. Well, there was, fr01n this patch of blood 
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which I ~testified to that it was approximately 
' . eighteen or twenty inches across 1t, there wa:s 
a smear of blood that run back up the high-
way as far as I could track it, down to the 
drop-just littie mere flakes of blood on the 
rocks, was 179 feet; from the clot of blood 
back, I didn't measure it, but ab,out thirty 
or forty feet this sme·ar was very prominent, 
omd you could stand b.ack and se.e it very 
clearly.' 
Is that what you testified at the pr·eliminary 
hearing~ 
A. That's right. 
Q. Now on page 75: 
'Then the blood was over on the lefthand 
side of the road, was it~ 
A. Right. 
Q. How far from the lefthand side 6f the hard 
surface of the road area~ 
A. W·ell the center of the blood spot, I imagine 
about twelve inches; the outside edge of the 
b1lood spot was over near the edge of the 
paved surface. 
Q. And then leading hack from that hlood ·pool, 
or area about ·eighteen inches in diameter, 
you traced blood back. about 179 feet' 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And there was a smear of blood on the hard 
surface area, wasn't there~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. For how long? 
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A. There was a smear of blo1od for about thirty 
or ~orty feet. 
Q. And it was a very pronounced spot, was ~t 
not? 
A. Yes, very plain. 
Q. Is that what you testified to? 
A. Yes, I believe that is my testimony. 
Q. And further: 
'All right, for thirty ~or forty feet back this 
smear of blood was very pronownced omd was 
discern~ible, was it not? 
A. Right.' 
Is that your further testimony? 
A. That's right." ('T. 260-261) 
On direct examination the witness testified as fo'l-
lows: 
'' Q. I think your testimony yesterday, or the 
day before, I think you testified that when 
you went out there in the morning you could 
not detect any tire marks in any of the blood 
areas at all; that is your testimony in this 
cause? 
A. The first trip? 
Q. No, the s·econd trip. 
A. No, I didn't testify that on the second trip. 
The first trip I testified we didn't find any 
tire marks in the blood. 
Q. 'Veil, I will have to find it from the reporter. 
Didn't you testify yes,terday that when you 
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went out there and it came daylight is when 
you first saw the smear of blood~ 
A. That's right. 
Q. That you couldn't find any tire marks in any 
of the blood areas~ 
A. Yes, as far as tread was concerned, yes, I 
testified to that. 
Q. And in the preliminary hearitng you tes~ified 
the same thing, that there were no tire rrvarks 
or skid marks ~or brake marks in the are.a 
of the bZood otr the scene of the accident, 
didn't you? 
A. That's right." (T. 286). 
Notwithstanding this bloody mess that was present 
at the scene of the accident, not a drop of human Mood 
was ever found on the defendant's truck. A spot of 
blood was found on a U-bolt which wa;s. sawed off and 
sent to the F.B.I. There was also some hair found on 
the under carriage of the truck which was sent to the 
F.B.I. The report showed 1the spot of blood was not 
human blood but animal blood and the hair was squirrel 
hair. (T. 2'56-257). The following testimony of Mr. 
Hatch is pertinent: 
"Q. You didn't fond ~a spot of human bto~od aJY11!J 
place upon the truck of Deo;n, Peters10fb, did 
you? 
A. Nto, sir. 
Q. And you searche1d the truck ftrom the front bo 
the back and all und,~r the undercarriage, and 
all over the entire c1ar, and you didn't find 
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on.e solitary drop of hunwrn blood on the c,a,r, 
did you? 
A. That's right." (T. 257). 
"·Q. X·otwithstanding the oondition that t 1his body 
was in, notwithst:anding the fact that the.re 
was a po,ol of blood there eighteen of!' twenty 
inches in diameter and half an inch deeiP, and 
t.hat this blood, when it g~ot maylight you could 
see a very p1'1omJirnent, discernible smear of 
blood reachimg ~out to the e:ast ~award Artesia 
thirty 10r forty feet, and evidence of the: blood 
continuing ·On fior another distance, making 
a total,of 179 feet, notwithsttlanding the muti-
lated condition you. found the body ,as you 
have now described, you didn't find .a single 
solitMy drop of human blo1od on the truck, 
dlid you.? 
A. I did not.'' ( T. 283-284). 
In attempting to connect the Peterson 1truck with 
the accident, Mr. S. D. Hatch testified that he found a 
human tooth on the top of the front ax'le of the Peterson 
truck, which tooth was later identified by Dr. Stevens, a 
dentist, as the tooth that was missing from the mouth 
of the deceased. A careful analysis of this testimony 
leads to but one conclusion, that the testimony is not 
worthy of belief. In the first place, Mr. Hatch claimed 
he found the tooth about 6 :30 in the morning just after 
daybreak, lying on the top of a convexed axle about a 
foot from the wheel and at a point where the axle was 
from 13_4 to 214 inches wide. ( T. 285). It was lying 
in some oil or grease at that point. The testimony was 
offered that the tooth was knocked out of the deceased's 
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mouth at the time of the accident and lodged on the top 
of this convexed axle. If the ~tooth was found on the 
top of the axle as the State's witnes·s would have us 
believe, then the he.ad of the deceased had to come in 
contact with the undercarriage of the truck. 'The bloody 
condition of the road as herein set forth and the terrible 
mutilated condition of the body as testified to by Mr. 
Hatch ('T. 170) clearly demands that the obj·ect which 
caused these situations must have come in contact with 
a great amount of blood from the person of the deceased, 
and yet the undisputed evidence in the case from the 
State ''S own witness, shows that lthere was not a single 
solitary drop of human blood found on the Peterson 
truck. The Peterson truck is a 3~-ton F·ederal truck 
and from the place of the accident would have to travel 
approximately ten miles over rough roads with a human 
tooth 'lying on the top of a convexed axle not exceeding 
21,4 inches in width. This is impossible to believe and 
when we find in the evidence the testimony of Ralph 
Hatch, a servioe staJtion operator and relative of S. D. 
Hatch, that he steam cleaned with live steam with 40 
to 60 lbs. pressure the chassis of this truck two days 
before the accident ( T. 568-569) the possibility of the 
tooth riding on such an axle while the truck was travel-
ling ten miles over comparatively rough roads is wholly 
fanciful and. beyond credence. The inconsistent testimony 
of S. D. Hatch and Dr. J. W. Stevens lends further 
force to the incredibility of this evidence. Mr. Hatch 
testified at the preliminary hearing thaJt he found the 
tooth about 6 :30 in the morning just after daybreak 
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when he first returned from the scene of the accident 
and at that time he showed the tooth to Dr. Stevens., 
who was standing on the sidewalk beside the truck. 
Dr. Stevens testified that he was not on the sidewalk 
at 6 :30 in the morning; that he did not see the tooth 
until sometime between 9:00 and 10:00 o'clock in the 
morning when Mr. Hatch showed it to him after he had 
been examining the truck. (T. 359). The following testi-
mony is pertinent: 
''Q. Mr. Hatch, you were read a couple of sen-
tences out of your testimony at the prelim-
inary hearing found on page 86. So that the 
jury and the Court will know the entire con-
text of your testimony at that point, I want 
to ask you, beginning with page 85, if this 
is not your complete testimony with reference 
to the time that you found that tooth, and if 
you didn't testify as follows at the prelimin-
ary hearing, beginning up about a third of 
the way down: 
·' Q. Now whether anybody had been under the 
truck making an examination prior to the 
time that you made your examination, be-
tween five and six o'clock in the morning of 
September 7, you don't know that do you~ 
A. I do not. 
Q. When you got back there was the defendant's 
mother and fa;ther there 1 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What1 
A. Yes. 
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Q. What they had done to make an examination 
of that truck you don't know, do you' 
A. No, I don't know whether they made an ex-
amination of it or not. 
Q. What time Sunday morning was it when you 
found the 1tooth on top of the front ax'lef 
A. That w·as when I made the e;namimation, right 
.after daylight. I ·don't know what the oorrect 
time was, bu.t it was as· soon as it gat day-
light. 
Q. That was betw:e;en five arnd six o'clock in the 
morning 1then? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And you found the taoth at that time on t~op 
of the a;nle? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Arnd there isn't any question toot that state-
ment is true; is 1tnat correct? 
A. No question a~ all.' 
Is that what you so testified to at the pre-
liminary hearing~ 
A. Yes, that is my testimony. 
'Q. If Dr. Stevens wasn't ther·e between five and 
six o'clock in 'the morning then you didn't 
hand it to him at that time you found it, did 
you~ 
MR. COL.TON: We obj·ect to that question 
as being duplicitus. 
Q. I will withdraw the question. When you 
found the tooth between five and six o'clock 
in ~the morning, Dr. Stevens wasn't there to 
see it? 
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A. If it was between five and six. 
Q. Well, you told us it was just about daylight 1 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you told us it was between five and six 
o'Clock in the morning less than two minutes 
ago? , 
A. I said that.' 
MR. COLTON: Just a minute. I think coun-
sel should read whaJt the record indicates here, 
that he was interrupted in his answer. 
MR. McCULLOUGH: I wouldn't say that, 
I will say what the record shows. 
• Q. And you told us it was between five and six 
o'clock in the morning not less than two 
minutes ago? 
A. I said that.' 
Then, there is a dash by the reporter. 
'Q. Wait a minute. Did you tell us less than 
two minutes ago that it was between five and 
six o'clock in the morning? If you didn't, 
I will have the reporter read it. 
MR. COL'TON: Well, let him answer. 
A. I believe I s1tated if that was the time, it 
was after daylight, and if it was between five 
and six o'clock that was the time. 
Q. Well it wouldn't be between nine and ten 
'•·.'··· o'clock in the morning, would it? 
A. No. 
Q. And the time that you are talking about you 
were there, right after daybreak? 
A. Yes. 
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Q. And the people you tell us a'bout as being 
there were there right after daybreak. 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Including Dr. Stevens~ 
A. Yes.' 
Is that what your testimony was, Mr. Hatch T 
,-
A. That is my testimony." ('T. 293 to 296) 
DR. STEVENS POSITIVELY TESTIFIED THAT 
HE DID NOT SEE S. D. HATCH JUS.T AFTER 
DAYLIGHT BETWEEN FIVE AND 8IX O'CLOCK 
IN !THE MORNING OF SEPTEMBER 7th; THAT HE 
DID NOT SEE THE TOOTH IN QUESTION UNTIL 
SAMMY HATCH SHOWED IT 'TO HIM BETWEEN 
NINE AND TEN O'CLOCK SUNDAY MORNING. 
('T. 358-9). 
The accuracy of Dr. Stevens testimony is equally 
dubious. At the preliminary hearing, Dr. Stevens testi-
fied that the tooth which he examined and filed his 
initials '' J. W. '' in, was the upper right first bicuspid. 
('T. 345-346). On his cross examination at the tria'l, this 
witness became very much disturbed when he perceived 
that the tooth had been examined by defendant's experts 
and then he changed his testimony, stating that the tooth 
in question was a second bicuspid and not the upper 
right first bicuspid as he testified to at the preliminary 
hearing; that he had made a mistake in his testimony 
at the preliminary hearing. ( T. 346, 350-1-2). The doc-
tor further testified at the trial that he identified the 
tooth by reason of 1the fact that he had us·ed an explorer 
found in the undertaking parlor to probe into the socket 
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of. the n1issing tooth and discovered that the tooth was 
broken off in there; that part of the root structure was 
still there, that, the Apical end was still there in the 
socket. He reluctantly confirmed his testimony given 
at the preliminary hearing as shown by the following 
~testimony: 
"Q. Now you say, you testified here a few min-
utes ago that there was an instrument over 
at the undertaking parlor that looked 'like,-
what was that instrument, that you called i1t1 
A.. Oh, it was an explorer, prober, several in-
struments over there. 
Q. And you say from that explorer you deter-
mined that the socket of this missing toorth 
in the cadaver's mouth, you say that there 
was a tooth broken off in there. 
A. Part of the root structure was still 1there, 
the A pi cal end was still there in the socket. 
Q. I will ask you if you testified as follows at 
the preliminary hearing when this question 
or such a matter was talked about whether 
you could tell there was any broken tooth, 
on page 52: 
'Q. And that is app11oximately the size that would, 
fit into tha,t missing tooth, otr the cav~ty of 
the missilng tooth, is it woctor? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. w,as the tooth broken 10 ff? 
A. The tooth was, yes. 
Q. Was the rest of the tooth in the cavity or 
was it knocked out, too? 
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A. I can't tell you that; there was no X-roy 
made. · · .. ~Ju 
Q. Did you make an e;vamination t·o determ.ime 
that? · ·_;, ~ 
A. No, the blood was clotted in the socket atfui 
I didn't probe to see about that. 
Q. But the socket was ther1e, was it; you could 
see tha.t? 
A. Yes. 
Q. The balance of the to1oth, you couldn't detiei-
mine whethe·r it was iJn the s·ocket or not? 
A. No. 
Q. Nor you dJidn't determine that? 
A. No.' 
Isn't that what you test:ified vo? 
A. I d.i.dn't tremember probing for that root at 
the time. 
Q. Just a minut·e. I am -asking you if that is 
what you. testified at the prelimilrtary he:ar-
ing? · 
A. Yes. 
Q. Then in face of that sworn testimony you 
come into oourt now and tell us that you did 
exac#I!J opposite jr1om what you testJified? 
A. I made a mistake in telling you I didn't probe 
for that booth, lor I did." (T. 3·53-3154). 
The testimony of JOHN D. GIBBS. lends further 
credence to the fact that the Peterson truck was not 
involved in this acciden1t. Gibbs is an entirely disinter-
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ested· witness. He is a graduate of the University of 
Oklahoma and a surveyor for the 'Texas Company. In 
co-mpany with a Mr. Gump, he left Artesia for V·ernal, 
Utah, a few 1ninutes before 2:00 o'clock on the morning 
of September 7th. He saw Dean Peterson at the H & H 
Cafe in Artesia about 10:00 o'clock on Saturday ev;e-
ning. There was nothing abnormal about the manner 
in which he talked nor the manner in which he walked. 
He again saw Mr. Peterson at the Club 40 around mid-
night. He heard him talking to different people at that 
place, observed his actions and, from his observation, 
he was not under the influence of intoxicating liquor. 
He and ~fr. Gump IJ.eft Artesia about 2:00 o'clock driv-
ing a water truck of the H. R. Findley Company. (T. 
128). They were travelling toward Vernal on Highway 
40 .. They passed a number of passenger vehicles, includ-
ing· a passenger bus about the time they arrived at the 
Colorado line. When they were about eight miles east 
of . Artesia at a point known as the junction of the 
Bonanza road with Highway 40, the Peterson truck 
driven by Dean Peterson passed them going toward 
Vernal. Mr. Gibbs positively identified the truck as 
the one he had ·seen in Artesia and many times before 
in Vernal. He definitely identified the truck from de-
fendant's Exhibit "3" and also identified the sam·e truck 
when he reached the police station when ordered to 
report there by Highway Patrolman '8. D. Hatch. He 
testified that· Peterson was travelling about 35 Iniles per 
hour and that they followed close behind him until 1they 
got up about the Jensen bridge. The Jensen bridge is 
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east of the point of the alleged accident and cros·ses 
the .Green River at the little town known as Jensen. 
The clearance lights and tail lights of the Peterson 
truck were in their vision from the time the truck left 
the Bonanza road to the Jensen bridge, where the road 
turns. They lost sight of the Peterson truck as they 
slowed down ~to see if the cafe was open at J·ensen. 
Mr. Gibbs testified he did not observe any pickup truck 
parked on the righthand side of the road as you go 
toward Vernal between the Bonanza road and the Jensen 
bridge. (T. 403). They did not observe any object in the 
road 'like a human body and they saw no evidence of 
any accident between those points. They had good sealed 
beam headlights on their truck. Had there been any 
pickup truck parked on the righthand side of the road 
or if any body had been lying in the road they would 
have seen it during the ride from Bonanza road to the 
Jensen bridge. They were stopped by Highway Patrol-
manS. D. Hatch on Highway 40 near the Gat·eway Cafe. 
This was five minU!tes after Dean Peterson's truck had 
been flagged down by Sammy Hatch. ('T. 271). Sammy 
Hatch took the driver's license of Mr. Gump and or-
dered him to go to the city offices and leave his truck 
and remain there until Hatch returned. They did as they 
were ordered and went to the city office and ther·e saw 
the P~terson truck parked outside ·and Mr. Peterson, 
who was waiting in the office. The truck they saw was 
the same truck which they followed from the Bonanza 
road right up to the Jensen bridge. ( T. 40). After they 
arrived, defendant's father, mother and sister came to 
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the city office. Gibbs was with the Peterson family, 
including the defendant, for about 2~ hours during 
which time they examined the truck very carefully. He 
had occasion to talk with Dean Peterson throughout the 
period. He heard many questions propounded to Dean 
by his mother and father and the replies which Dean 
made to these questions. (T. 410). ·That during said 
time Dean Peterson's speech was coherent. He was nor-
mal as he wa'lked around and examined the truck. That 
he did not observe the odor of intoxicating liquor on his 
breath. That if there had been intoxicating liquor on 
his breath he would have sensed it as he talked with 
him throughout the 2~-hour period which he was with 
them at the city offices. (T. 411-412). That during the 
examination of the truck by the Peterson family and 
himself and Mr. Gump, no one stopped them in their 
examination, including Night 1\Iarshal Calvin Jorgenson. 
They left the city offices around 6:00 o'clock in the 
morning and came back between 9:00 and 10:00 o'clock, 
when Mr. Gump got his driver's licens·e back and they 
picked up the water truck and left. This witness clearly 
exonerated Mr. Peterson from any participation in the 
a'lleged accident. 
MR. JEFF L. DAVIS, a married man·· with two 
children and a resident of Orem, Utah, who formerly 
lived at Craig, Colorado, testified that he was living 
in Craig, Colorado, on September 6th and at that time 
he did not know any of the Peterson family, including 
Dean Peterson; that he was working for Chester Watson 
a1t Craig, Colorado. That prior to that time he had 
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stored some furniture over at Vernal at the home, of 
Mrs. Harvey Knight. That he hired a Ford pickup truck 
from the firm of Jones & Laughlin to go to Vernal to 
pick up his furniture in storage and bring it to Craig 
where he was residing. In company with a driver by 
the name of Jones he left Craig around 8:00 o'clock 
Sa;turday night, September 6th. He arrived in Vernal 
about midnight. After getting their furniture loaded 
at Mrs. Knight's hom·e they left Verna'l for Craig, :Colo-
rado, after 1 :30 a.m. Sunday morning September 7th. 
(T. 543-5). They were travelling on Highway 40 be-
tween 20 and 25 miles an hour with a load of furniture. 
The witness had gone over this road many times before 
and was familiar with the various land marks. They 
went over the Green River bridge at Jensen. When 
they were about 17 miles out of Vernal or about 4 miles 
east of Jensen, a ·1941 Chevrolet passed them going 
toward Artesia. When the car passed they were on a 
curve just as the road starts up a long grade. When 
the car passed them it was steaming, that is the steam 
was coming out of the radiator. The passenger car was 
travelling somewhere around 55 or 60 miles an hour. 
The hill or grade was about a mil.e and a quarter long. 
They continued to watch the car and just before it got 
to the top of the grade it stopped because it had got so 
hot that the engine froze up. When they got up to the 
car they noticed that the radiator and the grill. were 
caved in and the righthand fender was badly damaged. 
The radiator was "plumb dry" with a large hole in the 
radiator. There were two men and three girls. The 
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two nwn were so drunk they couldn't talk. The gi~ls 
said they were out of water and they hit a colt or some-. 
thing down by Jensen. (T. 548). They hooked a chain 
on the damaged Chevrolet automobile and started to pull 
the·Chevro'let into Artesia. The man steering the Chev-
rolet, because of his drunken condition, could not guide 
it and ~Ir. Jones went back and steered the car while 
Davis drove the pickup truck to the Jones Trucking 
Company in Artesia. It was after 3:00 o'cloek when they 
got to Artesia. When they stopped at Artesia they 
examined the Chevrolet. 'There was a five-inch hole in 
the radiator, the fender was pretty well smashed in 
and rubbing on the tire, the bumper was bent down. ( T. 
551). They left the Chevrolet at Artesia and then drove 
on into Craig. The fact that this witness is entirely dis-
interested and his testimony :remained absolutely un-
impeached, notwithstanding he gave the names of prom-
inent people in Vernal who could easily verify his pres-
ence at Vernal at the times which he testified to, no 
effort was ever made by the prosecution to impeach his 
testimony. It is clear that this Chevrolet car partici-
pated in the accident in question as no other accident 
was reported on this nighl 
Another enigma arises in this case when George 
Engen and his wife, Elsie Engen, two prominent citizens 
of Jensen, who operate the cafe known as Mom's Cafe, 
testified in support of defendant's Motion for a New 
Trial that on Sunday, :September 7, 1947, at the hour 
of 3 :15 A.M. when :they were about to close their cafe, 
Bert Karen and his brother, Lawrence, drove up to the 
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~afe. 'That Bert Karen went over 'to Harry Au Miller's 
house next to the cafe to get him to phone. While Bert 
Karen was getting Harry Au Miller, Mr. and Mrs. 
Engen came' out in front of their cafe and asked Law-
rence Karen what was the matter. Lawrence Karen 
replied, ''We had a fight o;nd the son of a bitch got out 
to piss and Bert 'rian over him." Mr. and Mrs. Engen 
saw the red Federal tru~k driven by Dean Peterson 
approximately fifteen minutes before the Karen brothers 
arrived at the cafe. See affidavit in support of motion 
for new trial, R. 46, and the testimony of these witnesses, 
T. 733 to 76'5. 
Defendant, Joseph Dean Peterson, took the stand 
in his own defense. Mr. Peterson had overseas campaign 
service for approximately four years ; he was wounded 
by shrapnel in his face which made one side of his face 
out of line with the other; that he did not drive the 
Federa'l truck anytime during the day of September 6th 
but that his sister was driving the truck during that 
day; that he got through work at his father ''S mill about 
7:00 o'clock in the evening and drove over to Jensen 
on business and later to Artesia. He had one drink about 
7:00 o'clock in the evening from the bottle which he 
purchased at Vernal to treat his business associates at 
Jensen. That the bottle was never opened after leaving 
Jensen. The remainder of this bottle was found by 
Sammy Hatch in his truck along with a coca-cola miXer. 
The :bottle bore a Utah liquor stamp and was more than 
half full after five peop1e had a drink out of it at ,Jensen. 
· (T. 583). He went over to Artesia for the purpose of 
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getting a permit to haul flour into Colorado. That he had 
some beer at Artesia but did not drink any hard liquor. 
(T. 588, 591). That he did not have any accident with 
his truck as alleged by the prosecution and he was not 
under the influence of intoxicating liquor at anytime 
during the night of September 6th and the early morn-
ing of September 7th. The great preponderance of the 
evidence substantiates this latter statement. There was 
no urinalysis made. S. D. HATCH and SHERIFF 
SNYDER testified that in their opinion he was under 
the influence of intoxicating liquor, but the Colorado 
officer, JOE TOBLER, who observed him throughout 
the evening, refused to testify that he was intoxicated 
and in answer to the question as to whether or not he 
was intoxicated, said that all he would say was ;fuat he 
had been drinking. (T. 332). 
Another member of the Colorado State Patrol, C. 
P. ALLISON, testified in relation to the condition of 
the defendant, that about 10:00 o'clock in :the ev·ening 
he noticed the smell of liquor on his breath. (T. 373). 
CALVIN JORGENSON, the night marshal at Ver-
nal, testified that defendant was under the influence of 
intoxicating liquor and when asked why he permit:ted 
him to drive his truck if he was in that condition, an-
swered "yes" to the following question: "So you let 
him drive the truck under the influence of intoxicating 
liquor rather than leave your car and get in his truck 
to take him up to the city office? Is that your answer? 
Yes, sir.'' 
The defendant's witnesses, who were pres·ent from 
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the time that Dean Peterson· arrived at the police sta-
ti<;>n at about 3 :30. A.M. to the time he was taken t9 jail 
at 6:00 o'clock in the morning, al'l testified tha;t th.ere 
was .no evidence of intoxication or that Dean Peterson 
was under the influence of liquor at that time. JOHN 
D. GIBBS, a tot~lly disinterested witness,. who talked 
and associated with Peterson during those 2~ hours, 
testified definitely that there was no evidence of intoxi-
cation as far as the defendant was concernedl'ffurt he 
was under the influence of intoxicating liquor. The Jus-
tice of the Peace at Artesia, MR. WILLIAM H. SAHLI, 
and MRS. ADAIR BRIMHALL, who observed the de-
fendant throughout the evening, testified tha;t he was 
not under the influence of liquor at anytime while he was 
in Artesia. The fact that the Colorado highway patrol 
officers refused to testify that he was under the influence 
of liquor has considerable probative force. The most the 
prosecution. could get from these witnesses was that, in 
their opinion, the defendant had been drinking. 
MR. ELISHA W ARN~R, Commissioner of the 
State Tax Commission, t·estified that on the 28th of June, 
1947, the driver's license of Dean Peterson was revoked 
by the State Tax Commission and the defendant. was 
not. present at the revocation her·ein; that the action of 
the Commission was predicated upon the report from 
Justice of the Peace Wayne Johnson at Springville, Utah, 
that· defendant was convicted of driving a car under the 
influence of liquor. The trial court refused defendant the 
right to present evidence that there was no such a con-
viction ever had in the justice court of Wayne Johnson. 
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STATEMENT OF ERRORS 
i. The court erred in overruling defendant's tno-
·tion to strike the entire testimony of Elisha Warner 
covering revocation of the driver's license of the de-
fendant. (T. 227). 
_2. The court erred in receiving in evidence State's 
Exhibit N, the certified copy of the order of revocation 
of defendant's driver's license. (T. 227, 228). 
3. The court erred in overruling defendant's objec-
tion to the State's offer to introduce in evidence the 
testimony of Elisha Warner taken on his voir dire ex-
amination, covering the transcript from page 212 to 
225. 
4. The court erred in overruling defendant's motion 
to dismiss the information and discharge the defendan:t; 
said motion was. made at the close of the State's case. 
Grounds for said motion are contained in transcript 
pages 388 to 389. 
5. The court erred in refusing to give defendant's 
requested instruction No.1. (R. 22, T. 728). 
6. The court erred in failing to give defendant's 
requested instruction No.2. (R. 23, T. 728). 
7. The court erred in refusing to give def·endant's 
requested instruction No.3. (R. 24, T. 728). 
8. The court erred in failing to give defendant's 
requested instruction No.4. (R. 25, T. 728). 
9. The court erred in failing to give defendant's 
requested instruction No.5. (R. 26, T. 728). 
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10. The court erred in failing to give defendant's 
requested instruction No.6. (R. 27, T. 728). 
11. The court erred in giving Instruction No. 1. 
(R. 28, T. 728). 
12. The court erred in giving Paragraph 2 of said 
Instruction No.1. (R. 28, T. 728). 
13. The court erred in giving Instruction No. 7 and 
each and every part thereof. (R. 31, T. 729). 
14. !The court erred in giving that portion of In-
struction No. 7 which reads : ''First, operating a motor 
vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating IJ.iquor.'' 
(R. 31, T. 729). 
15. The court erred in giving that portion of In-
struction No. 7 which reads : ''Second, driving while his 
driver's liceng,e was revoked." (R. 31, 'T. 729). 
1'6. The court erred in giving that portion of In-
struction No. 7 which reads: ''And, third, reckless driv-
ing, or, in other words, driving in wilful or wanton dis-
regard for the safety of others." (R. 31, T. 729). 
17. The court erred in giving Instruction No. 8. 
(R. 31, T. 729). 
18. The court erred in giving that portion of said 
Instruction No. 8 which reads, beginning with the sixth 
line, "and at such time, and while so operating his 
truck he was under the influence of intoxicating liquor, 
and that, being so, he drove his said truck recklessly or 
in marked disregard for the safety of the deceased." 
(R. 31, T. 729). 
19. The court erred in using the word "or" in 
line 9 of said Instruction No. 8. (R. 31, T. 729). 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
45 
20. · The cowt erred in giVIng Instruction No. 9 
and each and every part thereof. (R. 32, T·. 730). 
21. The court erred in giving Instruction No. 10 
and each and every part thereof. (R. 33, T. 730). 
22. The court erred in giving that portion of In-
struction No. 10 which reads, beginning with the word 
''and'' in the third line, ''And when such an unlawful 
act is done recldessly or with marked disr·egard for the 
safety of others." (R. 33, T. 730). 
23. The court erred in giving that portion of said 
Instruction No. 10 beginning with the word "and" in the 
13th line, which reads as follows: ''And that he drove 
his said truck recklessly or with marked disregard for 
the safety of the deceased." (R. 33, T. 730). 
24. The court ·erred in using the word "or" in the 
15th line of said Instruction No. 10. (R. 33, T. 730). 
25. The court erred in giving Instruction No. 11 
and each and every part thereof. (R. 33, T. 730). 
26. The court erred in giving Instruction No. 12 
and each and every part thereof. (R. 34, T. 730). 
27. The court erred in· giving Instruction No. 13 
and each and every part thereof. (R. 34, T. 731). 
28. The court erred in giving Instruction No. 15 
and each and every part thereof. (R. 36, T. 731). 
29. The court erred in giving that portion of said 
Instruction No. t5 which reads: ''Such negligence, how-
ever, does not justify or excuse the defendant from run-
ning into or against him with his truck, if you find from 
the evidence beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant 
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did rnn into or against him with his truck." (R. 36, T. 
731). 
30. ·Tlie cou:rlt erred in overruling defendant's mo-
tion for a new trial. (R. 43, T. 779'). 
31. The court erred in overruling defendant's ob-
j.ection to the questions propounded to S. D. Hatch as 
to whether or not defendant was under the influence of 
into~cating liquor as shown by the following testimony: 
"Q. And from your observation of the defendant 
Joseph Dean Peterson that you have just 
testified to as he got out of the truck, and 
after he got out of the truck, have you an 
opinion as to whether or not he was intox-
ica.ted f 
A. Ido. 
Q. You may state what that opinion is? 
MR. McCULLOUGH: Object to it on the 
ground it is immaterial, incompetent and irrele-
vant, no proper foundation laid to admit it, and 
no proper qualification shown of this witness to 
testify. 
THE COURT: Objection overruled; 
A. Yes, in my opinion he was under the influence 
of intoxicating liquor." (T. 120-121). 
32. The court erred in overruling defendant's ob-
jection to the questions propounded to Joe Tobler, a 
deputy sheriff of Moffit County, as to whether or not 
the. defendant was intoxicated at 12:00 o'clock on the 
night of September 6th, as shown by the following testi-
mony: 
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"Q. At twelve o'clock when you moved the de-
fendant's truck and observed him at the cafe, 
Club 40, what would you say with re'Spect to 
his being intoxicated~ 
MR. McCULLOUGH: I object to it' on 'the 
ground that it is immaterial, incompetent, irrele-
vant, too remote, no proper foundation laid to 
admit it, and no qualification shown of this .wit-
ness to testify. 
THE COURT: Objection is overruled. 
Q. You may answer. 
A. We'll, I saw no difference. 
Q. Well, when~ 
A. At twelve o'clock or thereabouts. 
Q. What would you say, was he intoxicated or 
not at that time? 
A. I would say he had been drinking." ('T. 332). 
33. The court erred in overruling defendant's ob-
jection to the questions propounded to Calvin Jorgenson, 
night marshal of Vernal City, as to whether or not de-
fendant was under the influence of intoxicating liquor, 
as shown by the following testimony: 
"Q. Now in your opinion, Mr. Jorgenson, was 
the defendant under the influence of intox-
icating liquor~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
MR. McCULLOUGH: Just a minute. I move 
to strike the answer. I tried to get the objection 
in before he answered but he answered too fast 
for me. 
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THE COURT : The answer may go out for 
the objection. 
MR. McCULLOUGH: I object to it on the 
ground no proper foundation laid to admit it, 
and no qualification shown in this witness totes-
tify. 
'THE COURT: The objection is overruled 
and the answer is reinstated." (T. 380-381). 
ARGUMENT 
Numerous statements of error have been assigned. 
Appe'llant will try to organize the Argument to cover 
these errors under various heads and propositions. 
PROPOSITION I. THE COURT ERRED IN AD:. 
MIT'TING TESTIMONY OF THE REVOCATION OF 
THE DRIVER'S LICENSE OF THE DEFENDANT. 
Statements of Error Nos. 1, 2 and 3 are covered 
under the foregoing Proposition. This issue was argued 
at length at the tune Elisha Warner, State Tax Com-
missioner, was called as a witness. Mr. Warner's testi-
mony was first taken on voir dire examination in the 
absence of the jury in support of the Sitate 's offer to 
show the revocation of the defendant's driver's license. 
The defendant objected to the introduction of this testi-
mony on the grounds that it was immaterial, incompetent 
and irrelevant and that no proper foundation had been 
laid upon which such an offer could be received in evi-
dence. (T. 212-225) The same objections we~e made to 
receiving in evidence State's Exhibit N, the certified 
copy of the Order of Revocation of defendant's driver's 
license. (T. 227-228). Defendant also made a motion to 
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strike the entire testimony of Elisha Warner covering 
the revocation of the driver's license of the defend8.rit. 
(T. 227). 
These objections were argued at length before the 
trial court. At the conclusion of the argument the court 
made its decision, in which he stated the fol'lowing: 
''THE COURT: Mr. McCullough, I think 
your argument is one this court might be per-
fectly willing to stand at your shoulder on before 
the Supreme Court. It is a little difficult for my 
reasoning to follow the reasoning of the decision 
in the Lingman case. But this court hasn't any 
inclination to attempt to overrule the Supreme 
Court. The decision that this court would make 
upon this record will put it square'ly. If the law 
is going to be changed, the Supreme Court is the 
proper tribunal to change it. ·Thus, this being a 
voir dire proceeding, and the tender being to show 
that this license had been revoked, the court over-
rules the objection to the introduction of evi-. 
dence. The court puts the ruling squarely upon 
that decision purposely in order that there can 
be no equivocation in the mind of the Supreme 
Court if this cas·e reaches there that the ruling · 
is made intentionally, with my analysis and inter-
pretation of the holding of that court. If that 
court then desires to change the law or say that 
this court has misconceived an interpretation of 
its decision, it will be that court to do so. That 
wil'l be the holding. 
MR. McCULLOUGH: May we have an ex-
ception to your Honor's ruling? 
THE COURT : Yes.'' ( T. 224-225). 
The trial court predicated his decision entirely upon 
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th~ case of STATE OF U'TAH v. LINGMAN, 97 Utah 
180. Defendant contends tha;t the trial court miscon-
ceiv~d the holding of the Lingman case and his interpre-
tation of the opinion of Mr. Justice Wolfe went far 
afield. 
The questioned testimony was offered after all the 
testimony was received with reference to the operation 
of the truck alleged to have been driven by the defen-
dant. 'There were only two eye witness,es to the opera-
tion of this car at the time of the alleged killing of 
James Curwood; that was the testimony of Bert E. 
Karen and his brother, Lawrence Karen, whose testi-
mony has been fuliy reported in the Statement of Facts 
above set forth. Defendant contended in his argument 
before the trial court that no competent evidence had 
been offered and received upon which any court or jury 
could make a finding that the driving of the truck in 
question by the defendant without a license had any 
causal connection whatsoever with the injuring of James 
Cnrwood and his su'bsequent death. 
In order that a person may he guilty of a criminal 
homicide arising from the negligent operation of an 
automobile, or its use for an unlawful purpose, or in 
violation of law, it is uniformly held that it must be 
shown that such negligent operation, or use for an un-
lawful purpose or in vio~ation of law, was the direet 
and proximate cause of the death; that is, that there 
was present a causal connection between the act and 
the death. The trial court held that the foregoing is 
an adequate statement of the law except that in case 
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of driving a car without a license and driving a car under 
the influence of liquor were exceptions to the law by 
reason of the fact that th.e Supreme Court of Utah had 
definitely held in the case of State v. Lingman that it 
was not incumbent upon the State to show that such 
violations of law were the direct and proximate cause 
of the death of the deceased and, furthermore, that .it 
was not incumbent upon the State to show any causal 
connection between such violations of law and the death 
of the deceased. Mr. Justice Wolfe in his ab'le opinion 
in the Lingman case certainly does not make any such 
exceptions as contended for by the trial court in the 
instant case. The following excerpts are pertinent to 
this issue: 
''. . . Likewise, when one commits a m{s-
deineanor, malum in se, it is enough that the 
killing occurred in the course of, or by reason of, 
such misdemeanor, AS LONG AS 'THERE IS 
A CAUSAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE 
ACT WHICH IS A MISDEMEANOR AND THE 
DEATH. But we think arm (a) also refers to 
some acts which are malum prohibitum, but not 
all such acts .... 
"'There are many other rules for driving 
mentioned in Title 57, the infraction of which 
may constitute a misdemeanor, but not all ·of 
which would constitute the basis for a conviction 
for manslaughter IF DEATH SHOULD RE-
SULT FROM THE INFRACTION. Infractions 
of rules of traffic may run the gamut from mere 
inadvertence or slight omissions to 'any act great-
ly dangerous to the lives of others and evidencing 
a depraved mind, regardless of human life,' which 
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is first degree murder. R. S. 1933, 103-28--3. Con-
cretely illustrated, the gamut of infractions of 
the traffic laws may range from all but completely 
stopping at a stop sign before entering a sparsely 
travelled portion of an arterial highway, to a 
drunken driver's madly careening down a traffiC-
laden street. Death from the former would oruy 
give rise to a civil action; from the latter per-
haps a charge of murder. Where is the line at 
which the infraction becomes more than civil neg-
ligence, that is, criminal negligence~ It is not 
possible to draw it mathematical!Jy. THE AC-
CORDION WORDS LIKE 'MERE NEGLI-
GENCE' AND 'GROSS NEGLIGENCE' OR 
'WANTON NEGLIGENCE' SUGGEST COM-
PARISONS ONLY AND GIVE NO ABSOLUTE 
RULE FOR GUIDANCE. WE 'THINK THE 
'UNLAWFUL ACT', 'THA'T IS, THE INFRAC-
TION, l\IUST BE DONE IN SUCH A MANNER 
AS TO MORE 'THAN CONSTITUTE A MERE 
THOUGHTLESS OMISSION OR SLIGHT 
DEVIATION FROl\I THE NORM OF PRU-
DENT CONDUCT. IT MUST BE RECKLESS 
OR IN MARKED DISREGARD FOR THE 
SAFETY OF OTHERS. WHEN IT DOES 
THAT, IT PASSES THE STATE OF MERE 
MALUl\I PROHIBITUM AND APPROACHES 
THE UNSOCIAL ASPECTS OF MALUM IN 
SE. And the spirit of the person while commit-
ting the infraction is not a test. A truck driver 
seriously bent on meeting a schedule of his rounds 
who shoots through an intersection as if he were 
driving the only car extant, is just as guilty of 
reckless conduct as the driver of a car full of 
revelers joyously cele1brating a football victory. 
CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE THEREFORE 
SUFFICIENT TO SATISFY ARM (A) OF 
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THE MANSLAUGHTER DEFINITION 
MEANS ~lORE THAN ~fERE THOUGHT-
LESSNESS OR. SLIGHT CARELESSNESS. 
IT :MEANS RECKLESS CONDUCT OR CON-
DUCT EVINCING A :MARKED DISREGARD 
FOR 'THE SAFETY OF OTHERS. 
"We now turn to arm (b) of the statute, 
R. S. 1933, 103-28-5(2), i.e., the commission of a 
lawful act which n1ight produce death (1) done 
in an un'lawful manner or ( 2) done without due 
care and circumspection. It will be noted that in 
this arm the act done contains the ingredient of 
'might produce death. 1 Theoretically any act 
might produce death. A slight scratch of a pin 
'might' produce death. We construe the phras-e 
to mean 'fraught with potentialities for produC-
ing death,' illustrations of which are the running 
of a car at high speed, however carefully, handl-
ing of loaded arms, explosives, deadly germs, etc. 
"The distinct characteristic then of arm (b) 
is that the act must be one which has knowable 
and apparent potentialities for resulting in death. 
If such an act is done in an un'lawful manner or 
without due care and circumspection, the criminal 
negligence is present. In other words, a danger-
ous act done in an unlawful manner or even with 
lack of the care which such an act calls for is 
done with criminal negligence. It does not require 
reckless handling or conduct evincing marked dis-
regard for the safety of others. The ingredient 
of intrinsic dangerousness, plus the un'lawful 
manner or the lack of due care and circumspection 
demanded by the nature of the act, even be that 
slight, constitutes criminal negligence. It is quite 
true that certain infractions of the traffic laws 
where the violation is done in a reckless manner 
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'or with marked disregard for the safety of others 
may also rise to the level of acts fraught with 
danger to human life, and perhaps be chargeable 
either under arm (a) or {b) of the statute. 
"Strictly speaking, under (b) the doing of 
the dangerous act is not itself unlawful. There 
must a:lways be the ingredient of doing it in an 
unlawful or careless manner, whilst under (a) 
some acts amounting to a violation of the traffic 
laws may be, by their very nature, dangerous 
to life. They are, therefore, unlawful and danger-
ous to human life, but since the test is reckless 
action or action marked by disregard of safety of 
others, the element that it might produce death 
if such element be present may be, in charging 
under the (a) arm, ignored. An illustration will 
make it dear. If the sp-eed limit is thirty miles 
per hour and a driver goes thirty-five ·miles per 
hour, he is violating the law, but the jury must 
also find that his action in so going was ·reckless 
in order to convict him under the theory of the 
(a) arm. It may also be the case that such speed 
was one which under the circumstances might pro-
duce death, but that is looked at as incident to, 
or a consequence which may result from, the 
recklessness. Since the act itself was unlawful, 
the jury does not need to find that element. If, 
however, the speed limit is sixty miles per hour 
and the driver is going fifty-five miles an hour, 
he is not by that alone doing an un'lawful act. 
But if the jury finds that such speed might pro-
du~e death (which it well might), then he is 
guilty of manslaughter, if in addition he did not 
carefully watch the road and for that reason an 
accident occurred. Such would come under arm 
(b). But wherever the act he was doing was 
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, itself unlawful and reckl~ss, the charge may be 
under arm (a)~ without the jury's determining 
whether the recklessness was such as might pro-
duce ·death, for surely if a lawful act which might 
produce death if done without due care, is man-
~laughter, the doing of an un1awful act which 
might produce death is manslaughter. In arm 
(a) the element of its potentiality for producing 
death is not material. Its unlawfulness plus reck-
lessness only is material. 
''In another aspect some acts which are 
chargeable under (a) according to the above 
tests may be chargeable under (h) or, stated in 
another way, acts which are chargeable under (b) 
.by a certain construction of the statute may be 
chargeable under (a). Arm (b) speaks of the 
'doing of a lawful act,. which might prodluce 
death, in an unlawful ma11Jfl)er'. This excludes at 
once all acts which are toif'ally prohibited, S1-t-ch as 
driving without a license, drivilng while wnder the 
influence of int·oxioating liquor, d,riving ·a car with 
bad brakes or with lights below test sboodards, 
etc. None of these can, rega;rdless of how ca.reful 
the driving, come ~tnder (b). And if such act to-
tally prohibited is &one recklessly or w~t!h marked 
disregard for the S·afety of others, it will be doVfl!e 
with criminal negligence ood if death results will 
sustain a charge of manslaughter unde.r arm (a).'' 
(STATE OF UTAH V. LINGMAN, 97 Utah 197 
to 201.) 
The writer cannot find the slightest implication in 
the decision of the Lingman case which would justify 
a trial court in holding that the unlawful act or acts 
upon which an involuntary manslaughter charge is based 
need not have a causal connection with the death of thL 
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deceased. It is a cardinal principle of law that the un. 
lawful act, to be a basis of the crime of involuntary 
manslaughter, must be the direct and proximate cause 
of the death of the deceased. In the instant case, where' 
is there any causal connection between the driving of 
the Pe,terson truck by the defendant without a license 
and the death of the deceased~ Certainly no one will 
contend that the fallacious "but for" rule has any 
application here. Therefore, it follows that death must 
be the natural r·esult and the probable consequence of 
the commission of the unlawful act upon which the 
homicide is based. 'The following cases are illustrative 
of this rule : 
California. PEOPLE V. BLACK (1931) 11 Cal. 
App. 90, 295. P. 87. 
Delaware. STATE V. LONG (1919) 7 Boyce 
397, 108 A. 36; STATE V. MciVOR (1920) 
31 Del. 123, 111 A. 616. 
Florida. THOMPSON V. STATE (1933) 108 
Fla. 370, 146 So. 201. 
Idaho. STATE V. GEE (1930) 48 Idaho 688, 
284 P. 845. 
Indiana. DUNNVILLE V. STATE (1919) 188 
Ind. 373, 123 N.E. 689; BLACKBURN V. 
STATE ( 1932) 203 Ind. 332, 180 N.E. 180. 
Michigan. PEOPLE V. BARNES (1914) 182 
Mich. 179, 148 N.W. 400. 
NorthCarolina. STATE V. SATTERFIELD 
(1930) 198 N.C. 682, 153 S.E. 155. 
Ohio. STATE V. SCHAEFFER (1917) 96 Ohio 
St. 215, 117 N.E. 220, L.R.A. 1918B, 945, Ann. 
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Cas. 1918E, 1137; JACKSON V. STA'TE 
(1920) 101 Ohio St. 152, 127 N.E. 870. 
Tennessee. KELLER V. STATE (1927) 155 
Tenn. 633, 299 S.W. 803, 59 A.L.R. 685; HIL-
LER V. STATE (1932) 164 Tenn. 388, 50 
s.,v. (2d) 225. 
Texas. NOR~IAN V. STATE (1932) 121 Tex. 
Crim. Rep. 433,52 S.W. (2d) 1051. 
Virginia. GOODMAN V. COM. (1930) 153 Va. 
943, 151 S.E. 168. 
Canada. REX V. WILMOT (1930) 64 Ont. L. 
Rep. 605, 52 Can. Crim. Cas. 336 (1930) 1 
D.L.R. 778. 
Thus, in THOJ\tlPSON v. STATE (1933) 108 Fla., 
370, 146 So. 201, it was said: 
''The ru1e of liability as to criminal and civil 
negligence is not the same. But in either case, 
where violation of a statute or ordinance is re-
lied on to prove that there was negligence in the 
infliction of injuries or death, the causal con-. 
nection between the violation of the statute or 
ordinance and the injury or death inflicted must 
be established. And in criminal cases it must he 
established beyond a reasonable doubt. In this 
case it is not clear beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the mere violation of the state statute pro-
hibiting the parking of motor vehicles on the 
highway (see chapter 10, 186 Acts 1925) caused 
the death of the driver of one of the colliding 
vehicles.'' 
In DUNNVILLE V. STATE (1919) 188 Ind. 373, 
123 N.E. 689, it was held that whether the unlawful act 
is committed in such wilfu'l disregard of the rights of 
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others as to show a wanton recklessness as to the life 
and limb of another person, or in violation of a positive 
statute under circpmstances that show reckless dis:reg~rd 
for the life and limb of another, it is always necessary, 
to support a ·conviction of manslaughter, that the un-
lawful act be the proximate cause of the death. 
In BLACKBURN V. STATE (1932) 203 Ind. 332, 
180 N.E. 180, it was said: 
'' It has been he~d by this court that, to con-
stitute the crime of manslaughter, there mu,st be 
such legal relation between the commission of 
the unlawful act and the homicide that it logically 
follows that the homicide occurred as a concomi-
tant part of the perpetration of, or in furtherance 
of an attempt to commit, the unlawful act. There-
fore it follows that death must be the natural 
result and the probable consequence of the com-
rnission of the unlawful act upon which the homi-
cide is based.'' 
In PEOPLE V. BARNES (1914) 182 Mich. 179, 
148 N.W. 400, a conviction of manslaughter for the kill-
ing of a pedestrian as the result of a cotlision, while 
operating an automobile on a public highway at an 
excessive rate of speed in violaJtion of the statute relat-
ing to the operation of motor v·ehicles, was reversed on 
the ground that it did not appear that the homicide 
was the direct and natural result of the unlawful act. 
Where the evidence in a prosecution for involuntary 
manslaughter based solely on the violation of a statute, 
fails to show a proximate causal re'lation between the 
breach of the statute and the death, which is essential 
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to such a prosecution, a conviction cannot be sustained. 
(STATE V. SATTERFIELD (1930) 198 N.C. 682, 153 
S.E. 155.) 
The following case and the dicta in the decision 
is squarely in point with defendant's position that the 
failure to comply with the license law is immaterial until 
it can be shown that such failure was the proximate 
cause of the death of the deceased. 
In JACKSON V. STATE (1920) 101 Ohio St. 152, 
127 N.E. 870, wherein it appeared that the killing was 
occasioned by the violation of a statute forbidding an 
excessive rate of speed in the operation of a motor 
vehicle, the court, in holding that the disobedience of 
the statute must have been the proximate cause of the 
death, said: 
''The square question is 'liaised here .as to 
whether an accidental, urnint.entiowal killing of a 
person by another engaged in an unlawful ,act 
makes that person guilty of manslxuughter under 
the statute, irrespective of any connection be-
tween the unlawful,act ·(Jffl,d the unintentional kill-
ing, and it seems to this oourt that an analysis 
of the illogical a.nd absurd 'iiesults which would 
necessarily follow the reoognition of such a rule 
will a.nswe.r the query. For instance, if it be the 
law, as charged by the tria~ court in this case, 
that, if the jury find the accused unintentionally 
struck and killed the decedent, while engaged in 
an unlawful act, to wit, operating his car at a 
greater rate of speed than 15 miles per hour: 
they must find him guilty of manslaughter with-
out reference to causation, then it must follow 
that if the accused had been violating any other 
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valid statute, however unconnected with the death 
at the time of the unintentional kil'ling, he would 
be guilty of manslaughter. For instance it is a 
violation of a valid statute to operate a mot'O·r 
vehicle without having first registered s~ame with 
the secretary of state, ... yet, ... should the 
driver of an automobile, while driving his car 
without first having .registered it with the secre-
tary 1of st.ate, ... be so wnfortu(fi)(Lte as t.o wnin... 
tentionally run over and loill a person who inad-
vertently or pur>posely projected himself in frowt 
of the car, he would be guilty of manslaughter; 
for clearly it would be an wnintentional killing 
by a pe.rson operating a car in violation of a 
valid statute. And yet there would be no relar 
tionship between the v1iolation of the statut.e and 
the de,ath. The accident would have occurred just 
as surely had the motor vehicle been registered. 
. . . The proximate caJUse would have been the 
same in each case although the result to the driver 
of the car would have been the appalling diffetr-
ence between criminal guilt and leg.al itwJwcence." 
The unlawful driving relied on as the basis for 
a manslaughter action must have been the proximate 
cause of death, and if death occurred from any cause 
other than the unlawful act, there is no criminal lia-
bility. STATE V. SCHAEFFER (1917) 96 Ohio St. 
21'5, 117 N. E. 220, L.R.A. 1918B, 945, Ann. Cas. 1918E, 
1137, wherein the court said that, ''THE SAFER AND 
SOUNDER DOCTRINE SEEMS TO BE RECOG-
NIZED IN MOST OF THE STATES, THA'T THE 
UNLAWFUL ACT MUST BE A PROXIMATE 
CAUSE OF THE KILLING." 
The mere vio~ation of a statute will not sustain a 
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conviction of Inanslaughter where it appears that the 
killing was not the natural or probable result of the 
unlawful act. (HILLER V. STATE (1932) 164 Tenn. 
388, 50 s.w. (2d) 225. 
·The writer can conceive of very few situations in 
which the operation of an automobile without a driver's 
license could be the proximate cause of the death of a 
deceased in_ a case of involuntary manslaughter. For 
instance, if a person who is nearly blind was refused 
a license to drive motor vehicles because of impaired 
vision and then in marked disregard for the safety of 
others drove an automobi~e without a license and, in 
consequence of his impaired vision, killed the deceased, 
,,... such unlawful act would be the basis of the crime of 
involuntary manslaughter. Testimony that his license 
had been refused 1because of impairment of vision would 
1 •. • be competent because of its causal connection with the 
failure of the defendant to see the situation which re-
sulted in the death of the deceased. But, in the instant 
case, where is there any such analogy 1 The evidence 
3howed that the defendant's license had been revoked on 
an a.Neged violation of Title 57 for driving a motor 
vehicle under the influence of liquor. Therefor·e, the 
failure to have a license to drive the truck in question 
could not possibly have any causal connection with the 
death of the deceased and the admission of the testimony 
of Elisha Warner that the defendant's license had been 
revoked was erroneous and prejudicial. Such testimony 
would materially prejudice a jury against the defendant. 
It is rather peculiar tha;t the court ruled against 
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the defendant when this i'llegal evidence was received, 
then reversed his position when he instructed the jury 
that the illegal act of driving the truck without a license, 
to be a basis of the crime of involuntary manslaughter, 
must have directly and proximately caused the death 
of the deceased. See Instruction No. 10, R. 33. 
To the same effect was instruction No. 8 in which 
the· court stated that the driving of an automobile under 
the influence ·of liquor could not be the basis of involun-
tary manslaughter unless it was shown that the death 
of the deceased was directly and proximately caused 
thereby. R. 31. 
Instruction No. 10, as given by the court reads as 
follows: 
"You are insrtructed that it is unlawful for 
any person to operate a motor vehicle upon any 
public highway of this state while his license to 
do so is revoked, and when such an unlawful 
act is done recklessly or with marked disregard 
for the safety of others, the person so driving 
is guilty of criminal negligence, and where such 
criminal negligence direct~y and proximately 
causes a death, the person guilty of so operating 
such motor vehicle and thus causing the death, 
is guilty of involuntary manslaughter. That is 
to say, if the evidence in this case convinces your 
minds beyond reasonable doubt that at the time 
and place charged in the information the defen-
dant did operate his truck upon a public high-
way as charged, and that at such time his driver's 
license had been revoked, and that he drove his 
said truck recklessly or with marked disregard 
for the safety of the deceased, AND THAT ALL 
OF SUCH ACTS DIRECTLY AND PROXIM-
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ATELY CAUSED THE DEATH OF THE D~­
CEASED, then the defendant is guilty of invol-
untary 1na.nslaughter and it is your duty to ~o 
find .. , 
:! A careful scrutiny of the testimony of Bert and 
-,_ 
· .. ~ .• 
Lawrence Karen pertaining to the operation of the 
truck which it is alleged was involved in 1this accident 
clearly eliminates any possible finding 1by the court or 
the jury that the defendant's alleged unlawful act of 
driving his truck without a license was done recklessly, 
and with marked disregard for the safety of others, 
amounting to criminal negligence and that such criminal 
negligence directly and proximately caused the death of 
the deceased, James Curwood. There is not a scintilla 
of evidence in the record to justify a finding of simple 
negligence let alone criminal negligence. We respectfully 
call your attention to the verbatim :testimony of Bert 
Karen, who observed the movement of this truck as 
it approached the place of the accident, the manner in 
which it was traveUing, the manner in which the driver 
turned to the left to avoid striking the Karen truck, 
which was illegally parked in the road, and the opera-
tion of the truck after it passed the scene of the acci-
dent. Assuming that the truck in question struck the 
deceased (and the ·evidence clearly preponderates to 
the contrary) where is the evidence that shows that the 
defendant did anything in the operation of the truck 
which caused the injuries and subsequent death of the 
deceased? The deceased was found at the extreme left-
hand edge of the hard surfaced pavement with his head 
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approximately 14 to 18 inches to the right of the left-
hand edge of the pavement and his feet projecting over 
onto the shoulder of the road. Did the deceased inad-
vertently or purposely proje~t himself in front of the 
truck? No one knows. What position was he in when 
he was struck by the truck? No one knows. Did he 
stwnble in his drunken condition from the borrow pit 
onto the shoulder of the road in the path of the oncom-
ing truck? No one knows. Was he struck when he was 
lying down? No one knows. The truck was being oper-
ated in a norma~ and safe manner at a normal and 
medium rate of speed. The driv·er was alert to the 
existence of the Karen truck in the course of his path 
and turned out as any normal and prudent driver would 
naturally do. Is it not logical to assume that the de-
ceaS"ed probably stwnbled from the left-hand borrow 
pit where he had gone to relieve hims·elf in his drunken 
condition onto the road at the time of the a:cciden~ 
rather than conclude that the driver would turn his 
truck from its normal course to avoid striking the Karen 
truck and then recklessly and with marked disregard 
for the safety of others, run over the deceased. 
PROPOSITION II. THE COURT ERRED IN 
ADMITTING EVIDENCE ON THE ISSUE AS TO 
WHETHER 'THE DEFENDANT WAS UNDER THE 
INFLUENCE OF INTOXICATING LIQUOR AT THE 
TIME OF THE ALLEGED CRIME. 
This Proposition will cover defendant's Statements 
of Error Nos. 11, 12, 13, 14, 31, 32 and 33. 
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The great preponderance of the evidence clearly 
establishes that the defendant was not under the influ-
ence of intoxicating liquor at the time of the alleged 
crime or within a reasonable time before or thereafter. 
We have the testimony of three Vernal police officers 
that, in their opinion, ·he was under the influence of 
liquor, and, on the other side we have the testimony 
of two Colorado State Highway Patrolmen, Mr. Joe 
Tobler and C. P. Allison, who were called by the State 
and who definitely stated that all they could say from 
their observation of Mr. Peterson was ~that he had been 
drinking. Neither of these men would testify that he 
was under the influence of intoxicating liquor. The fol-
lowing disinterested witnesses, who were called by the 
defendant, clearly eliminates any implication that de-
fendant was under the influence of intoxicating liquor. 
John D. Gibbs, who was riding in the water truek that 
followed the Peterson truck and who was with the de-
fendant in custody for 20 hours at the police station, 
after 2¥2 hours of observation of Mr. Peterson he freely 
testified that there was nothing to justify a finding that 
defendant was under the influence of intoxicating liquor. 
WilHam H. Sahli, the Justice of the Peace at Artesia, 
Colorado, observed the defendant on Saturday night and 
up as late as 2:00 o'clock Sunday morning. He un-
equivocally said there was no evidence of intoxication 
or that the defendant was under the influence of intox-
icating liquor. This testimony was corroborated by Mrs. 
Adair Brimhall, who observed the conduct of Mr. Peter-
3~ son at the Club 40 up until the time that Peterson left 
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at or around 2:00 o'clock in the morning. The above 
defendant's witnes.ses were entirely disinterested. Then, 
in addition to these, we have :the testimony of E. H. 
Peterson, Mary Peterson and Maxine Peterson, the fa-
ther, mother and· sister of the defendant, who were 
with him fo·r approximately 20 hours immediately fol-
lowing his arrest. It may be said these are interested 
witnesses. The Peterson family are one of the outstand-
ing families in Uintah County. The father operates the 
flour mill in that section of Utah and it is hard to believe 
that a mother and father would testify under oath to 
an untruth as to their son's condition. The significant 
fact that the Colorado officers refused to corroborate 
the glib opinions of the police officers of Vernal lends 
~redence to the positive ass·erltions of the disinterested 
witnesses and the family of the defendant. 
Irrespective of what finding should be made on the 
testimony on this issue, we call the court's attention to 
the fact that there was no foundation laid by any testi-
mony of the State which would justify the court in 
admitting evidence as to whether or not the defendant 
was under the influence of intoxicating liquor. There 
was no action on the part of the defendant in the opera-
tion of his truck (assuming that his truck was involved 
in the accident) which would in anywise justify the 
court in admitting testimony that the defendant was 
under the influence of intoxicating liquor. The argu-
ments advanced on the preceding Proposition are apro-
pos on this issue. We challenge anyone to point out a 
single, solitary act on the part of the defendant in the 
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operation of his truck which would lay the foundation 
to admit evidence as to whether the defendant was 
mtder the influence of liquor. The trial court seemed 
to think that the failure to keep a proper lookout ahead 
was sufficient to permit the liquor issue to come into 
the case. A careful analysis of the testimony of the only 
two witnesses to this accident eliminates any implica-
tion that the defendant failed to maintain a proper look-
out at the time of the accident. The evidence clearly 
shows to the contrary. Bert Karen testified that he 
watched the truck come from the east as it travelled 
toward his parked pickup truck; that it was travelling 
at a normal rate of speed, which was not slow nor fast 
but just medium, or about 35 miles per hour; that not-
withstanding the Karen pickup truck was parked sub-
stantially out onto the hard surfaced area of the high-
way and in the path of the Peterson truck, Peterson 
drove his truck to the left and around the pickup truck 
in a manner which was prudent and careful in the 
opinion of Bert Karen, an experienced automobile mech-
anic; that the Peterson truck continued on up the road 
in a normal and proper manner. Where is there any 
evidence which the court or jury could say that James 
Curwood was in a position on the road so that a person, 
in the exercis·e of reasonable diligence would have seen 
him there in time to have avoided the accident~ The 
i~ deceased's own associates did not know how he got onto 
fnei the road. They never even saw him get out of the truck. 
C'n stel We don't know whether he projected himself in front 
poin1 1 of the Peterson truck, or how or in what manner he 
tdalltn 
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came in contact with the Peterson truck. Did he stumble 
out of the borrow pit after the beam of the headlights 
of the Peterson truck had passed the spot where he was 
and tthen came in contact with the Peterson truck? No 
· one knows. It was incumbent upon the State to show 
that the defendant not only failed to observe the defen-
dant, or that in the exercise of reasonable diligence, 
should have observed him. The failure of the State ~ 
assume this burden and the fact that an accident oc-
curred wiJI. not justify the court in permitting the liquor 
issue to be considered by the court or the jury in deter-
mining whether or not the defendant's acts and conduct 
were reckless and in marked disregard to the rights of 
the deceased. From the evidence in this case, how could 
any court or jury make a finding that the death of the 
deceased was proximately caused by the defendant being 
under the influence of intoxicating liquor? Even assum-
ing that he was under the influence of intoxicating liquor, 
the principle of proximate cause has. the same applica-
tion to this alleged unlawful act as it does to the alleged 
unlawful act of driving the truck without a license, 8.8 
S"et forth in our argument in the previous Proposition. 
The foHowing citations are pertinent: 
One who drives his car correctly, and on the proper 
s~de of the highway, even though he be tthen intoxicated, 
cannot be convicted of homicide if death results wholly 
from the carelessness or negligence of the driver of 
another car which collides with that driven by the ac-
cused. NORMAN V. STATE (1932) 121 Tex. Crim. 
Rep. 433,52 S.W. (2d) 1051. 
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In GOODMAN Y. COM. ( 1930) 153 Va. 943, 151 
S.E. 168, a conviction of involuntary manslaughter was 
reversed where it was not shown that death was the 
natural and probable result of any reckless or culpably 
negligent act on the part of accused. 
99 A.L.R. 772, 733, 77 4. 
The driving of an automobHe on a public highway, 
by a driver intoxicated or under the influence of liquor, 
is a crime by statute, and, if such act proximately causes 
the death of another, the driver is guilty of involuntary 
manslaughter. BLASHFIELD, Vol. 8, p. 102. Cyclo-
pedia of Automobile Law and Practice. 
PROPOSITION III. THE COURT ERRED IN 
OVERRULING DEFENDANT'S MOTION iTO DIS-
MESS THE INFORMATION AND DISCHARGE THE 
DEFENDAN'T AT THE CLOSE OF THE STATE'S 
CASE (T. 476-480) AND IN REFUSING TO GRANT 
DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 
1 (R. 22, T. 728) TO DIRECT THE JURY TO RE-
TURN A VERDICT OF NOT GU1LTY. 
This proposition covers Statements of Error Nos. 
4 and 5. ~~:€ 
Appellant contends that no ·competent evidence was 
offered and received upon which the court could permit trl'i1 
the case to go to the jury. We have copiously set forth :::~:1~ 
--;· 
the facts in the :Statement of Facts with the necessary 
~-~ transcript and record pages. It is mainfestly impos-
e ,}5 
sible for a court or jury to make a finding of criminal 
! byJ Tel. [ negligence under the facts of this. case as disclosed by 
the record. We again reiterate, it is incumbent upon 
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th~ State to prove crimina'l negligence on the part· of 
the defendant, and that such criminal negligence was 
the proximate cause of the death of James Cnrwood 
Where in the evidence can we find factual support that 
the State has successfully assumed this burden 1 The 
argument on the Statements of Error hereinabove set 
forth are equally apropos to the propositjon here. Re-
ceiving of incompetent evidence on issues for which no 
proper foundation had been laid created a situation 
which not only befogged the court through his misin-
terpretation of the Lingman case, but misled the jury as 
to the application of the law of the case. The court 
should never have permitted the liquor and license issues 
to have come into the case until a proper foundation had 
been laid for the admission of this evidence. No such 
foundation was ever 'laid and defendant's motion to 
dismiss the information and discharge the defendan4 
made at the close of the State's case, should have been 
granted. 
We submit that this court should reverse the ver-
dict and remand the case to the trial court with in-
structions to dismiss the same. 
PROPOSITION IV. THE COURT ERRED IN 
FAILING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY AS TO 'THE 
ELEMENTS OF INVOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER 
AND THE LAW PERTAINING THERETO, BUT ON 
THE CONTRARY ERRONEOUSLY INSTRUCTED 
THE JURY ON THESE FUNDAMENTAL PRIN· 
CIPLES. 
This Proposition covers defendant's S:tatements of 
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Err-or Nos. 5 to 29 inclusive, as hereinabove set forth. 
:Many of these statements of error have been pre-
viously discussed in this brief. Instructions pertaining 
to the liquor and license issues are excepted to for the 
reason . that no competent evidence had been offered 
and received upon which a jury could make a finding 
on these issues. 
We call the court's attention to the erroneous in-
structions in which the trial court uses the alternative 
''or'' in place of the conjunctive ''and'' in defining 
criminal negligence. Criminal negligence, as defined by 
the ruling of your Honorable Court, clearly indicates 
that an unlawful act must be done recklessly and in 
marked disregard for the safety of others to constitute 
criminal negligence which is the basis of involuntary 
manslaughter. The trial court throughout his instruc-
tions uses the alternative ''or'' instead of the conjunc-
tive ''and''. In other words the jury were instructed 
to find the defendant guilty if the defendant drove his 
truck recklessly or in marked disregard for the safety 
of others. Reckless driving may or may not be criminal 
negligence. Criminal negligence is defined by your Hon-
orable Court in State v. Lingman, 97 Utah 180 as reck-
less conduct evincing a marked disregard for the safety 
of others. The defendant assigned as error the use of 
the alternative ''or'' instead of the conjunctive ''and'' 
in Instruction No. 7 ( Statem,ent of Error No. 16, R. 31, 
T. 729); Instruction No. 8 (Statements of Error No. 17, 
18, 19, R. 31, T. 729); Instruction No. 10 (Statements 
of Error Nos. 21, 22, 23, 24, R. 33, T. 730). 
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Defendant contends that Instruction No. 15 (State. 
ments of Error Nos. 28 and 29, R. 36, ·T. 731) and par. 
ticularly that portion of said instruction which reads: 
''Such negligence, however, does not justify or excuse the 
defendant from running into or against him Wlith h~ 
truck, if you find from the .evidence beyornd reasonable 
doubt that the defendant did rwn ilnto or against him 
with his truck," was ambiguous and misleading. The 
quoted portion of said instruction is left without qualifi-
cation and therefore would mislead the jury into believ-
ing that irrespective of the negligence of the deceased 
in going upon the public highway in an intoxicated con-
dition, that such negligence would not justify or excuse 
the defendant from running into or against him with his 
truck irrespective of whether or not defendant was 
criminally negligent in so doing. 
CONCLUSION 
From the foregoing it appears that the jury was 
erroneously instructed on matters of law to the pre-
judice of the appellant; that the verdict is contrary to 
the law and to the evidence; and that defendant's mo-
tion for new trial should have been granted. That there 
was no competent evidence off·ered and received upon 
which the court or jury could make a finding that the 
death of the deceased was proximately caused by an 
unlawfui act or acts of the defendant amounting to 
criminal negligence. That :there was nothing that appel· 
lant did or that he failed to do that can be said to have 
been the cause of the death of the deceased. That ·the 
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,_ 
,.. judgment appealed fron1 should be reversed and the 
~~ cause ren1anded for such further proceedings as to this 
l eonrt may seem proper. 
ar. 
li Respectfully submitted, 
:McCULLOUGH, 'VILKINSON & BOYCE 
Atto"ffleys for Appellant 
R. \'"ERNE McCULLOUGH 
of counsel 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
